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Introduction
As their name suggests, rules of general applicability have a broad scope considerably
more comprehensive than laws specifically directed at a particular activity. In the context of
constitutional adjudication, the concept of general applicability is commonly used to distinguish
general laws being applied to regulate speech or religious activities from laws aimed specifically
at those very activities. For example, a law requiring individuals to obtain a permit before
conducting large-scale events in a public park is a general law that does not target speech,1
whereas a law requiring individuals to obtain a permit before conducting a march or
demonstration in a public park specifically targets speech. A law prohibiting animal cruelty is a
general law that is not aimed at a religious practice, whereas a law prohibiting ritual animal
sacrifice is specifically aimed at a religious practice.2
Laws of general applicability usually are characterized by neutrality toward speech or
religion. As explained by the Supreme Court, the concepts of neutrality and general applicability
are interrelated, and “failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not
been satisfied.”3 While the concepts are not identical,4 a law that fails the requirement of
neutrality invariably will fail the requirement of general applicability.5 Thus, neutrality toward
speech or religion is a necessary component of a law of general applicability.
The principle of general applicability parallels equal protection jurisprudence; to require
laws to be generally applicable corresponds to the requirement of equal treatment under the law.6
Along the same lines, in determining if a law is neutral, guidance can be found in equal
protection discourse.7 In fact, the Supreme Court has said that “[n]eutrality in its application
requires an equal protection mode of analysis.”8
Laws specifically directed to regulating speech or religion are subject to a heightened
degree of judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment, which of course prohibits the government
from making any law that abridges the free exercise of religion or freedom of speech.9 Under
this form of heightened scrutiny, laws aimed at expressive or religious activity will be struck
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See Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316 (2002).
2
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
3
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
4
See Richard Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise, Lukumi and the General Applicability
Requirement, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 850, 865 (2001).
5
However, the converse is not true; a law that is not generally applicable may be neutral in regard to speech or
religion.
6
See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542-45.
7
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540.
8
Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Commissioner of New City, 397 U.S. 664, 696 [1970] [Harlan, J., concurring]).
9
U.S. Const., Amendment I (1791). The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law abridging the
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Amendment are incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states. See Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
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down as unconstitutional unless the government can demonstrate that they are carefully tailored
to serve a strong state interest. In contradistinction, laws of general applicability, even when
used to regulate speech or religious activities, may evade review under the First Amendment
altogether. In some instances, the Court has held that, despite their restrictive effect upon speech
or religion, rules of general applicability do not implicate the First Amendment.10 For some
cases, therefore, it is extremely important to determine whether the law in question is a rule of
general applicability, neutral in regard to speech or religion.
Of course, the degree of a law’s generality is a relative matter and one that can vary
considerably subject to the point of view from which it is assessed. Determining whether a law
is general or specific is a complicated matter that may depend upon the perspective from which a
law is considered.11 Along one dimension, a law may appear relatively general, while along
another dimension less so.12 To illustrate this phenomenon, Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf
posit a comparative analysis of a rule recognizing a right to procreate and a rule recognizing a
right of intimate association.13 At first glance, the former might seem more specifically
delineated than the latter and certainly not broad enough to include a right to engage in sexual
relations with a partner of the same sex. On the other hand, a rule recognizing a right to intimate
association would not encompass a right to undergo anonymous artificial insemination or to
supply an ovum for laboratory fertilization and subsequent incubation by a surrogate mother.14
Viewed along the latter dimension, it is the rule recognizing a right to intimate association that
appears more specifically delineated. In truth, neither rule can be said to be more or less general
than the other; the comparative extent of each rule’s generality varies according to the
perspective from which it is appraised.
Moreover, the generality of a law is a matter of degree. All laws are selective to some
15
extent, but some more so than others. As a result, the determination of whether a law is general
or specific can be rather subjective. At one extreme are broadly-worded laws, comprehensive in
scope and neutral in regard to speech or religion; at the other extreme are specialized laws that
categorically single out speech or religious activities for disfavored treatment. Richard Duncan
maintains that between these extremes there is an “infinity of hard cases” involving laws not
readily characterized as either general or specific.16
It should be mentioned that, although freedom of the press is expressly guaranteed by the
First Amendment, the Supreme Court has consistently taken the position that the press is not
immune from the application of general regulatory laws.17 For example, the Court has ruled that
10
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Richard Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise, Lukumi and the General Applicability
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allows an exception permitting alcoholic beverages to be served with meals at restaurants; should this law be
considered a neutral law of general applicability or does the exception render the law discriminatory toward
religion? Id. at 859-60.
17
Cohen v. Cowles Media Company, 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991).

Rules of General Applicability

3

the press must obey copyright laws,18 the National Labor Relations Act,19 the Fair Labor
Standards Act,20 and antitrust laws.21 Still, Erwin Chemerinsky asserts that in none of those
cases was there proof that application of the law in question would undermine First Amendment
values.22 If the press could show in a particular situation that the application of a general
regulatory law significantly burdened freedom of the press, it might be necessary for the Court to
consider whether an exemption from the law was appropriate.23
Aside from the arena of freedom of the press, the Supreme Court’s treatment of rules of
general applicability has been anything but consistent. In cases involving equal protection of the
law, freedom of speech, and the free exercise of religion, the Court’s treatment of rules of
general applicability has wavered from one extreme to the other, leaving a perplexing body of
constitutional doctrine.
Equality
The principle of general applicability is similar to the principle of equality that underlies
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 Laws that selectively impose a
burden on expressive or religious activities are a form of discrimination antithetical to the
principle of equality.25 Neutral laws of general applicability appear to be nondiscriminatory,
although in some instances they may have a discriminatory impact.
The notion that rules of general applicability are nondiscriminatory traces back to a
dissenting opinion written by Justice Harlan in Douglas v. California.26 In that case, the
Supreme Court held that in a criminal case where a state grants a first appeal as a matter of right,
it must provide free counsel for indigent defendants. A state’s failure to do so, the Court ruled,
amounts to invidious discrimination between the rich and the poor that violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 Equality was lacking, the Court explained,
because the rich enjoy the benefit of counsel, while the poor do not.28 Justice Harlan dissented,
arguing that the Equal Protection Clause was not apposite to the case because, as he saw it, the
state’s failure to provide counsel for indigent persons was not a discriminatory act.29 While
agreeing that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination between the rich and the poor
“as such” in the formulation and application of laws, Justice Harlan contended that “it is a far
different thing to suggest that (the Equal Protection Clause) prevents the State from adopting a
law of general applicability that may affect the poor more harshly than it does the rich….”30
By Justice Harlan’s account, the state has no affirmative duty to “lift the handicaps flowing from

18

Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
20
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
21
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1169 (3d ed. 2006).
23
Id.
24
See Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck: The General Applicability Requirement in Free
Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 627, 637-39 (2003).
25
See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542-43.
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Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
27
Id. at 355-58.
28
Id. at 357-58.
29
Id. at 361-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
30
Id. (emphasis added.)
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differences in economic circumstances,” and therefore laws of general applicability such as the
one in Douglas “do not deny equal protection to the less fortunate….”31
Justice Harlan’s reasoning in Douglas reduces the Equal Protection Clause to a shield
against facial discrimination but little else. As he sees it, so long as a law is generally applicable,
whatever discriminatory impact it may have is irrelevant. His suggestion that the Equal
Protection Clause does not prevent a state from enacting a law of general applicability “that may
affect the poor more harshly than it does the rich” sounds eerily reminiscent of Anatole France’s
pronouncement that “The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to
sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.”32 Of course, Anatole France was
being ironic; Justice Harlan was not.
Despite its dismissive attitude-or perhaps because of it-Justice Harlan’s line of thought in
Douglas was embraced in another dissenting opinion some years later, this one written by Justice
Thomas in M.L.B. v. S.L.J.33 This case concerned the dismissal of a mother’s appeal from a
Chancery Court order permanently terminating her parental rights. Her appeal was dismissed
because she could not afford to pay the fee for preparation of a trial record required in advance
for an appeal.34 In approaching the issue presented by the case, the Court stressed the gravity of
the situation, pointing out that a state’s authority to permanently sever a parent-child bond
“demands the close consideration the Court has long required when a family association so
undeniably important is at stake.”35 Noting that the case involved both equal protection and due
process concerns, the Court concluded that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment to deny the
mother’s right to appeal the termination of her parental rights solely because she could not afford
to pay the fee for preparation of the record.36 Justice Thomas, however, felt otherwise. In a
dissenting opinion relying heavily on the Harlan dissent in Douglas as well as a similar Harlan
dissent in Griffin v. Illinois,37 Justice Thomas argued that there was no equal protection violation
when the right to appeal is denied by a “facially neutral law” requiring a person to pay a fee for
the preparation of a trial record.38 In his view, the Equal Protection Clause “seeks to guarantee
equal laws, not equal results.”39
For supporting authority, Justice Thomas turned to Washington v. Davis, in which the
Supreme Court upheld a government employment test that was challenged as racially
discriminatory because a considerably greater proportion of black applicants failed the test than
did white applicants.40 In upholding the test, the Court ruled that proof of discriminatory intent
31

Id. at 362.
Anatole France, LE LYS ROUGE (THE RED LILY) ch. 7 (1894).
33
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
34
The fee was $2,352.36. Id. at 109.
35
Id. at 117. Quoting several cases, the Court also said that:
“A termination of parental rights is both total and irrevocable. Unlike other custody proceedings, it leaves
the parent with no right to visit or communicate with the child .... Santosky held that a ‘clear and
convincing’ proof standard is constitutionally required in parental termination proceedings. In so ruling,
the Court again emphasized that a termination decree is ‘final and irrevocable.’ ‘Few forms of state
action,’ the Court said, ‘are both so severe and so irreversible.’ As in Lassiter, the Court characterized the
parent's interest as ‘commanding,’ indeed, ‘far more precious than any property right.’” Id. at 118-19.
36
Id. at 120.
37
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
38
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 135-38 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
39
Id. at 135 (quoting Personnel Administrator of Mass. V. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 [1979]). Justice Thomas
advanced a similar position in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 373-78 (Thomas, J., concurring).
40
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
32
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or purpose was required to trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.41 The Court
also ruled that while the disproportionate impact of a law was not irrelevant, standing alone it
was not sufficient to establish purposeful discrimination.42 Using a deferential form of minimal
scrutiny, the Court went on to approve the test, despite the fact that the test had never been
validated to establish its reliability for measuring job performance.43 For Justice Thomas, then,
the lesson of Davis was that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits only purposeful discrimination
and that a disparate impact, even upon members of a racial minority, does not violate equal
protection.44
By this account, unless a malevolent intent can be shown to underlie a law, facial
neutrality will be considered dispositive. If a law is neutral on its face or generally applicable,
that it may affect one group of persons more harshly than another is of no consequence.
According to this view, facially neutral laws of general applicability are not considered
discriminatory despite any disparate impact they may have; the requirements of equal protection
are satisfied so long as a law is neutral on its face and has a general application.
Davis, however, involved a situation significantly different than the one in M.L.B. As
noted in the majority opinion in M.L.B., written by Justice Ginsburg, in Davis, although there
certainly was a disparate impact along racial lines, the disparity was not absolute; successful test
takers included members of both races, as did the group of unsuccessful test takers.45 In contrast,
the governmental action at issue in M.L.B. resulted not merely in a disproportionate impact, but
one that was “wholly contingent on one’s ability to pay and thus ‘visit[ed] different
consequences on two categories of persons.’”46 In other words, the disparate impact in M.L.B.
was absolute, applying to all indigent persons and to no one outside that class. Thus, the
discriminatory effect in Davis was less acute than in M.L.B., and therefore less indicative of a
need for heightened judicial scrutiny.
Even so, the decision in Davis is questionable.47 Charles Lawrence maintains that by
requiring proof of discriminatory intent or purpose, Davis places a very heavy, and often
impossible, burden of persuasion on the wrong side of the dispute.48 Discriminatory purpose
may be covert or unconscious, and improper motives often are easy to hide.49 Because laws
usually are enacted through the interaction of multiple motives, governmental officials frequently
will be able to argue that neutral considerations prompted their actions.50 Moreover,
41

Id. at 239-40.
Id. at 241-42.
43
Id. at 229.
44
M.L.B., 519 U.S. 135 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Along similar lines, Justice Scalia has stated that absent proof of
discriminatory intent, a generally applicable law that has a disparate impact is not unconstitutional. In his view,
“The Fourteenth Amendment does not regard neutral laws as invidious ones, even when their burdens purportedly
fall disproportionately on a protected class.” Crawford v. Marion County, 553 U.S. 181, 207 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
45
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 126.
46
Id. At 126-27 (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 [1970]).
47
See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1105 (1989); David Strauss,
Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935 (1989).
48
Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L.Rev.
317, 319 (1987).
49
Id. at 322-23, 354-55.
50
Id. at 319. See also, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977): “Rarely can it
be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely
by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the ‘dominant’ or ‘primary’ one.”

42

Rules of General Applicability

6

discriminatory treatment, whether intentional or not, is harmful.51 In Davis itself, persons were
denied employment in a discriminatory manner on the basis on a test that had never been
validated to establish its reliability for measuring job performance. By discounting the
significance of the disproportionate impact of the test, the Court in Davis condoned
governmental action that resulted in the denial of equal treatment. Unwilling to deal with the
complexities of discrimination, the Court simply denied its existence.
In Davis, the Court did allow that the disparate impact of a law, if so extreme as to be
systematic, may be sufficient in itself to establish unconstitutional discrimination.52 So, for
example, in a case like Gomillion v. Lightfoot, where government officials redrew the boundaries
of a city, transforming it from a square shape to a “strangely irregular” 28-sided figure and
thereby placing all but a few black persons, but not a single white person, outside the city limits,
there could be no doubt that the redistricting plan amounted to purposeful racial discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.53
The Court further recognized in Davis that an invidious discriminatory purpose may be
inferred from the totality of relevant facts, including the fact that a law has a disproportionate
impact.54 Accordingly, in Hunter v. Underwood the Court found that the Equal Protection
Clause was violated by a state law permanently denying the right to vote to anyone convicted of
a “crime involving moral turpitude.”55 Although the law was racially neutral on its face,
evidence conclusively demonstrated that the law was enacted with racial animus, which, in
conjunction with the law’s racially disparate impact, established the presence of invidious racial
discrimination.56
Whatever else might be said about Davis, it is clear that it did not overrule Douglas.
While Justice Thomas argued in his dissenting opinion in M.L.B. that Davis adopted Justice
Harlan’s (dissenting) view in Douglas,57 a majority of the Court thought otherwise, explicitly
stating that Davis “does not have the sweeping effect” attributed to it.58 And, while Justice
Thomas frankly admitted in M.L.B. that he was inclined to overrule Douglas and its progeny,59 a
majority of the Court reaffirmed their continuing vitality.60
Notwithstanding the exhortations of Justice Thomas or Justice Harlan, few other justices
have been so willing to overlook the discriminatory impact of facially neutral laws. In fact, the
Court has acknowledged on several occasions that “A law nondiscriminatory on its face may be
grossly discriminatory in its operation.”61 Nor have apologetics for facially neutral laws deterred
the Court from finding a number of such laws to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Neither the
Harlan dissent in Douglas nor the Thomas dissent in M.L.B. was able to dissuade a majority of
the Court from finding violations of the Equal Protection Clause. In other cases, too, the Court

51

See Kenneth Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 San Diego L.Rev. 1163, 1165 (1978).
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241.
53
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340-41 (1960).
54
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
55
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
56
Id. 229-32 (1985).
57
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 135 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
58
Id. at 126.
59
Id. at 139 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
60
Id. at 110-12, 126-27.
61
Griffin, supra note 37, at 17, n. 11; M.L.B., supra note 33, at 127 (quoting Griffin).
52
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has seen fit to strike down facially neutral laws of general applicability due to their disparate
impact.62
Freedom of Speech
In the course of interpreting the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has developed a
network of rules to protect freedom of speech. Within this structure, regulations of speech are
subject to searching judicial scrutiny, which allows speech to be restricted only when it is the
cause of serious harm.63 The harm must be real and demonstrably so.64 The expression of an
idea may not be prohibited merely because it is disagreeable or offensive.65 A regulation of
speech must be narrowly tailored to accomplish its purpose, and an overbroad regulation of
speech may be declared unconstitutional on its face.66 Content-based regulations of speech are
subject to strict judicial scrutiny and will be struck down as unconstitutional unless shown to be
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.67 Content-neutral regulations of speech68 are
subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny and will be struck down as unconstitutional unless
shown to be carefully tailored to achieve an important state interest.69
In Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., however, the Supreme Court abandoned these principles.
Arcara involved a New York statute authorizing the closure of an adult bookstore on the ground
that it was a public health nuisance because it was being used as a place for prostitution and
lewdness.70 Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals had
ruled that the closure order violated the First Amendment by interfering with the right of the
owners of the bookstore to sell books on the premises of the store. The New York court
followed the four-part test set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. O’Brien that
governs cases involving regulations of expressive conduct.71 As the New York court viewed the
situation, the closure order failed the fourth part of the O’Brien test, which requires that a statute
incidentally restricting expressive activity be no broader than necessary to achieve its purpose.
The court reasoned that the order was much broader than necessary to achieve its purpose of
curbing illicit sexual activity and that an injunction against continuing the illegal activity on the
premises could achieve the same effect without restricting respondents' bookselling activity.72
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court saw things quite differently and, reversing the
New York court, ruled that the closure order did not violate the First Amendment. In an opinion
62

E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 33; Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404
U.S. 189 (1971); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981); Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005).
63
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
64
Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
65
“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397. 414 (1989).
66
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587-88(2010).
67
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
68
As used in this sense, a content-neutral regulation of speech is one that is aimed at speech in general but is neutral
in regard to the message conveyed by speech, in other words, that does not discriminate on the basis of the content
of speech. A neutral law of general applicability, on the other hand, is one that is aimed more broadly at conduct
and is neutral in regard to speech generally. For example, a law that prohibits handbills is content-neutral (because
it prohibits all handbills regardless of their content), but is not a neutral law of general applicability (because it is
aimed at a form of speech, handbills).
69
Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications Commission, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
70
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
71
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
72
Arcara, 478 U.S. at 701-702.
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written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court took the position that the O’Brien test had no
relevance to the case because the imposition of the closure order was not directed to expressive
conduct.73 From the high court’s perspective, the First Amendment was not implicated by the
enforcement of “a public health regulation of general application against the physical premises in
which respondents happen to sell books.”74 Dismissing any constitutional concerns, the Court
declared, “(N)either the press nor booksellers may claim special protection from government
regulations of general applicability simply by virtue of their First Amendment protected
activities.”75
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the majority insisted that the First Amendment was not
implicated by a rule of general applicability merely because it had a restrictive effect upon
expressive conduct. He rebuffed the claim for First Amendment protection as asking for too
much, “since every civil and criminal remedy imposes some conceivable burden on First
Amendment protected activities.”76 In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor made a similar
point, arguing that any other conclusion would lead to the “absurd result” that any governmental
action having some conceivable inhibitory effect upon speech, such as the arrest of a newscaster
for a traffic violation, would require analysis under the First Amendment.77
The approach taken by Chief Justice Burger in Arcara diminishes the scope of protection
afforded by the First Amendment for freedom of expression. In his view, rules of general
applicability that “happen” to restrict expressive activities are not subject to First Amendment
requirements.78 So long as a law is directed generally to conduct, the fact that it imposes “an
incidental burden” on free speech is irrelevant.79 By this account, even when they have a
restrictive effect upon freedom of expression, rules of general applicability are exempt from
review under the First Amendment.
Chief Justice Burger was willing to acknowledge that under some circumstances rules of
general applicability were not exempt from First Amendment review. Scrutiny under the First
Amendment may be evoked where a general law imposes a disproportionate burden upon parties
engaged in expressive activity.80 This occurred in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Commissioner of Revenue where the Court ruled that a use tax assessed on the cost of paper and
ink products violated the First Amendment by imposing a significant burden on freedom of the
press.81 In addition, scrutiny under the First Amendment may be triggered where a general law
restricts conduct that has a significant expressive element.82 This occurred in United States v.
O’Brien, where an individual was convicted of burning his draft card in violation of a federal
statute that made it a crime to destroy, mutilate, or otherwise alter a draft registration card. 83

73

Id. at 705, n2, 707.
Id. at 707.
75
Id. at 705.
76
Id. 705-706.
77
Id. at 708 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
78
“…(W)e conclude the First Amendment is not implicated by the enforcement of a public health regulation of
general application against the physical premises in which respondents happen to sell books.” Arcara, 478 U.S. at
707.
79
Id. at 705.
80
Id. 704-707.
81
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
82
Arcara, 478 U.S. 704-707.
83
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See also, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288 (1984) (using heightened First Amendment scrutiny to review a federal regulation prohibiting camping in
74
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Although it upheld the conviction, the Court applied First Amendment scrutiny because the law
in question restricted conduct (burning a draft card to protest the Viet Nam war) that had a
substantial expressive element.
In Arcara, however, Chief Justice Burger insisted that the situation involved neither the
Minneapolis Star nor O’Brien paradigm, and therefore First Amendment concerns were not
implicated.84 He professed that “unlike the symbolic draft card burning in O’Brien, the sexual
activity carried on in (Arcara) manifests absolutely no element of protected expression.”85 This
misguided attempt to distinguish Arcara from O’Brien disregards the fact that the closure order
in Arcara was directed not merely to the sexual activity occurring in the bookstore, but to the
entire operation of the bookstore. By dictating closure of the bookstore (for a year, no less), the
order restricted conduct--the selling and buying of books--that undeniably had a strong
expressive element. In narrowing his focus to the particular conduct that prompted the closure
order and thereby ignoring the extent of the conduct actually encompassed within the scope of
the order, Chief Justice Burger was able to pretend that there was no restriction of expressive
activities protected by the First Amendment.
Justice Blackmun entered a dissenting opinion in Arcara, asserting that the First
Amendment provided protection against all laws that abridge freedom of speech, not just those
specifically directed at expressive activity.86 He maintained that the Court had never previously
suggested that a state may suppress speech without justification so long as it does so through a
generally applicable regulation not directed to expressive conduct.87 Justice Blackmun admitted
that at some point the impact of state regulation on freedom of speech may become so attenuated
that it is easily outweighed by a countervailing state interest.88 But when a state directly and
substantially impairs First Amendment activities, such as by shutting down a bookstore, he
thought that the state must show, at a minimum, that it has chosen the least restrictive means of
pursuing its legitimate objectives.89
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion in Arcara was not persuasive to the New York
Court of Appeals, which, when the case was remanded to it, reinstated its former ruling that the
closure order was improper, this time, however, basing its ruling on the guarantee of freedom of
speech set forth in the New York Constitution rather than the Federal Constitution.90 While the
New York court recognized that it was bound to follow the decision in Arcara in determining the
scope and effect of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution, the court made it clear that
it possessed independent authority to interpret the state constitutional guarantee of free speech
more expansively than the federal guarantee.91 Noting New York’s long history and tradition of
fostering freedom of expression, the court reasoned that the “minimal national standard”
established by the Supreme Court for First Amendment rights could not be taken as dispositive
in determining the scope of the state constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression.92 Under
certain parks as applied to restrict a group of demonstrators from sleeping in Lafayette Park and the Mall to call
attention to the plight of the homeless.)
84
Id. at 707.
85
Id. at 705.
86
Id. at 709 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87
Id.
88
Id at 710.
89
Id.
90
People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1986).
91
Id. at 494-95.
92
Id.
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the New York Constitution, there was no doubt that bookselling was a constitutionally protected
activity or that closing a bookstore may have a substantial impact on that activity.93 While a
bookstore of course cannot claim an exemption from statutes of general operation aimed at
preventing nuisances or hazards to the public health and safety, bookstores are entitled to
“special protection” under the state guarantee of freedom of expression.94 Because the closure
order was broader than necessary to achieve its purpose of curbing illicit sexual activity, the
Court concluded that it violated the New York constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.
The New York court also took the occasion to respond to Justice O’Connor’s assertion in
Arcara that to accept the bookseller’s claim of First Amendment protection would lead to the
“absurd result” that any governmental action having some conceivable inhibitory effect upon
speech would require analysis under the First Amendment.95 Not so, the New Court explained,
because not every government regulation of general application that has some impact on free
speech implicates constitutional guarantees.96 Arresting a newspaper reporter for a traffic
violation, the example noted by Justice O’Connor, does not rise to the level of a constitutionally
cognizable claim.97 “But closing a bookstore for a year, as is required by this statute, cannot be
said to have such a slight and indirect impact on free expression as to have no significance
constitutionally.”98
Chief Justice Burger’s approach in Arcara has not found much favor in subsequent
Supreme Court cases involving freedom of expression. The Court rarely, if ever, mentions it as a
reason for rejecting First Amendment free speech claims. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
despite the exhortations of Justice Scalia, the Court declined to adopt the Arcara approach.99
Barnes involved the prohibition of nude dancing under a public indecency statute proscribing
nudity. By a vote of 5-4, with no majority opinion in the case, the Court found that the
prohibition of nude dancing did not violate the First Amendment. Although fully eight of the
justices agreed that nude dancing was expressive conduct entitled to some degree of protection
under the First Amendment, they differed sharply as to whether the prohibition of nude dancing
could be squared with relevant First Amendment principles.100 Of all the justices, only Justice
Scalia thought that the First Amendment had no application to the case. The challenged
regulation must be upheld, he proclaimed, “because as a general law regulating conduct and not
93
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specifically directed at expression, it is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all.”101
Echoing the Burger and O’Connor opinions in Arcara, Justice Scalia argued in Barnes
that virtually every law restricts conduct and virtually any prohibited conduct can be performed
for an expressive purpose.102 In Scalia’s view, therefore, it was not reasonable to implement
First Amendment review for every restriction of expression incidentally produced by a general
law regulating conduct.103 This argument, however, was not enough to sway any other justice,
perhaps because it cuts such a deep swath in the scope of the First Amendment and allows
freedom of speech to be suppressed without requiring any justification for the suppression. To
exempt general rules that have a restrictive effect upon speech activities from any First
Amendment scrutiny at all, as Justice Scalia would do, would grant the government carte
blanche to restrict freedom of speech through general rules without showing a proper reason for
doing so.
Moreover, the contention that virtually any conduct can be performed for an expressive
purpose and therefore may be used to seek First Amendment shelter seems hyperbolic. As
Justice Blackmun explained in his dissenting opinion in Arcara, at some point the impact of state
regulation on freedom of speech will become so attenuated that it is easily outweighed by a
countervailing state interest,104 if not dismissed altogether as not presenting a claim under the
First Amendment. Not every government regulation that has some impact on speech, no matter
how slight or indirect, implicates First Amendment concerns.105
Occasionally, the Court may refer to the concept of general applicability, when a
challenged law is not one of general applicability, so as to provide all the more justification for
the use of heightened scrutiny or particular rules designed to protect freedom of speech. For
instance, in Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., the Court allowed a facial challenge to a
law restricting the placement of newspaper vending racks on public property.106 The Court
explained that a facial challenge was appropriate because the law in question operated as a
licensing system that gave government officials substantial discretion, which could be utilized to
discriminate on the basis of the content or viewpoint of speech.107 In addition, the Court noted a
second feature of the licensing system that further supported a facial challenge: the licensing
system was “directed narrowly and specifically at expression or conduct commonly associated
with expression.”108 Thus, it was unlike “laws of general application that are not aimed at
conduct commonly associated with expression and…carry with them little danger of
censorship.”109
The Court’s statement in Lakewood might be dismissed as mere obiter dictum;
nonetheless it suggests a lingering belief that laws of general applicability pose less threat to
First Amendment concerns than laws specifically aimed at expressive activities. That is not to
say, however, that when used to restrict expressive activities, laws of general applicability are
exempt from review under the First Amendment.
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In a recent case, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court rejected the notion that
First Amendment requirements are downgraded where speech is being regulated through a law
of general applicability.110 Holder involved a constitutional challenge to a federal statute that
made it a crime to knowingly provide material support to any entity designated by the Secretary
of State as a foreign terrorist organization. The statute defined material support to include
property, money or other financing, equipment, facilities, weapons, training, and expert advice or
assistance. The plaintiffs, who wanted to advise certain terrorist organizations how to achieve
their goals through legal channels such as using international law to resolve disputes peacefully
or to petition the United Nations for relief, challenged the constitutionality of the statute as
applied to their activities. In defending the statute, the government argued that rather than using
the form of strict scrutiny that ordinarily would be employed to review statutes such as this one
that are content-based, the Court should reduce the degree of scrutiny to an intermediate level
because the statute “generally functions as a regulation of conduct.”111 In refusing to downgrade
the level of scrutiny, the Court pointed out that the government’s argument was contrary to a
number of precedents, most prominently Cohen v. California.112 The Court explained that Cohen
also involved a generally applicable law regulating conduct (a breach of the peace statute) but
when Mr. Cohen was convicted under the statute for wearing a jacket bearing a profane epithet
(“Fuck the Draft”), the Court did not see fit to apply a reduced level of scrutiny.113 To the
contrary, the Court recognized that the breach of the peace statute, though a generally applicable
law, had been directed at Cohen because of the message conveyed by his speech.114 That is, he
had been found to violate the breach of the peace statute due to the offensive content of his
particular message. The Court therefore applied strict scrutiny and reversed Cohen’s
conviction.115
In the Court’s view, the situation in Holder fit the same category as Cohen. The law in
question was directed generally at conduct, but was being applied to regulate expressive
conduct—speech. As a result, strict rather than intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate
standard of review. Using strict scrutiny, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute as
applied to the plaintiffs’ activities on the ground that there was a compelling state interest in
protecting national security from the threats posed by foreign terrorist organizations. In Holder,
though, the Court squarely ruled that the full force of the First Amendment pertains to rules of
general applicability when they are employed to regulate expressive activities.
Free Exercise of Religion
In 1963, the Supreme Court decided Sherbert v. Verner,116 ruling that laws that burden
the free exercise of religion were subject to strict judicial scrutiny and had to be justified by a
showing of a compelling state interest. Under that approach, the Court ruled in Sherbert that the
government violated the Free Exercise Clause by denying unemployment benefits to a member
of the Seventh Day Adventist Church who quit her job rather than work on Saturday, which she
observed as the Sabbath. Noting that the appellant had been forced to choose between following
the precepts of her religion and forfeiting unemployment benefits, the Court concluded that the
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state’s imposition of such a choice upon the appellant was a significant burden on the free
exercise of religion that was not supported by a compelling state interest.117 Adhering to the
ruling in Sherbert, the Court applied strict scrutiny in several other cases in holding that the Free
Exercise Clause was violated where persons were denied unemployment benefits for quitting
their jobs for sincerely-held religious reasons.118
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court extended the ruling in Sherbert in holding that the Free
Exercise Clause was violated by requiring Amish children to comply with a compulsory school
attendance law contrary to their religious beliefs.119 The Court stated in Yoder that the case
could not be disposed of on the ground that the compulsory attendance law applied uniformly to
all children and did not facially discriminate against religions or a particular religion, or that it
was motivated by legitimate secular concerns.120 “A regulation neutral on its face may, in its
application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for government neutrality if it
unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”121 After finding that the impact of the compulsory
attendance law was severe and undeniably at odds with the fundamental tenets of Amish
religious beliefs, the Court concluded that the Amish were constitutionally entitled to an
exemption from the law.122
In Yoder, the Court unqualifiedly stated that a neutral law of general applicability may, as
applied, violate the Free Exercise Clause. It should be noted, however, that aside from Yoder
and the unemployment benefits cases, from 1960 through 1990 the Court has never upheld a free
exercise claim when the law at issue was one of general applicability.123 Reviewing the Court’s
record in free exercise cases during this period of time, one commentator declaimed that the
Sherbert free exercise doctrine was “more talk than substance.”124 Although perhaps a bit
histrionic, that statement nonetheless accurately reflected that the Supreme Court rarely sided
with free exercise claimants.125
Even though free exercise claimants rarely won before the Supreme Court, there were
those who argued that the Sherbert doctrine went too far in upholding the right to free exercise of
religion.126 Critics of Sherbert pointed out that in effect it granted an exemption for religiouslymotivated conduct from neutral laws that otherwise were constitutionally valid.127 It was said
that this “promotes its own form of inequality: a constitutional preference for religious over nonreligious belief systems.”128
Whatever the merits or demerits of Sherbert, free exercise doctrine changed severely in
1990 when the Supreme Court decided Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
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v. Smith.129 This case arose in Oregon when two Native Americans were fired from their jobs at
a drug rehabilitation clinic for ingesting peyote, a hallucinogenic substance, for sacramental
purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church. After being denied unemployment
compensation by the Employment Division of the Oregon Department of Human Resources, the
Native Americans filed suit, claiming that the denial of unemployment compensation violated
their right to the free exercise of religion.130 Eventually the case reached the Supreme Court,
which ruled against the claimants, holding that there was no violation of the Free Exercise
Clause. In so ruling, the Court set forth a new test to govern free exercise claims, according to
which the Free Exercise Clause cannot be used to challenge a neutral law of general
applicability. Abandoning the compelling state interest test of Sherbert,131 the Court held that
the Free Exercise Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a “valid
and neutral law of general applicability” on the ground of religious belief.132 That is, religious
beliefs do not excuse an individual from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that is within state authority to regulate.133
The Court distinguished Sherbert and the other unemployment cases on the ground that
the conduct at issue in those cases was not prohibited by law, whereas the use of peyote was
prohibited by Oregon law.134 Building on that distinction, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
declared that “We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”135
Thus, the Court ruled that religious motivation for using peyote did not exempt individuals from
a neutral criminal law that was concededly constitutional as applied to those who use peyote for
other reasons.136
The Court took a different tack in distinguishing Yoder, asserting that it involved not only
a free exercise claim, but also another constitutionally protected claim, namely, the right of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children.137 In contrast, Smith did not present “such a
hybrid situation,” and therefore did not evoke the enhanced constitutional protection that was
appropriate in Yoder.138 So, the Court concluded that where a free exercise claim is unconnected
to another constitutionally protected right, such as the right of parents to direct the upbringing of
their children or the right to freedom of speech, a religious exemption from a neutral law of
general applicability will not be granted.139
Critics of the Scalia opinion in Smith, including some who agreed with the decision itself,
were especially scornful of its treatment of Yoder and the Sherbert line of cases. Michael
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McConnell found Smith’s use of precedent “troubling, bordering on the shocking.”140 Douglas
Laycock declared that the Court’s reading of precedent in Smith was “transparently
dishonest.”141 And William Marshall described the use of precedent in Smith as “border(ing) on
fiction.”142
Moreover, as Justice Souter explained in a later case, the “hybrid-rights” exception
announced in Smith is ultimately untenable.143 If a hybrid claim is merely one in which another
constitutional right is implicated, then the exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the
Smith rule and certainly would encompass the activity in Smith itself, as free speech and
associational rights were clearly implicated in the peyote ritual.144 On the other hand, if a hybrid
claim is one in which a litigant would actually be exempt from a generally applicable law under
another constitutional provision, then there would be no reason in a supposedly hybrid case to
evoke the Free Exercise Clause at all.145 Commentators have been routinely disdainful of the
hybrid-rights exception, viewing it as a bungled attempt to distinguish disagreeable precedent,146
and the Sixth Circuit refused to follow it on the ground that it was “completely illogical.”147
Other circuits have similarly declined to follow the exception148 and even its progenitor, Justice
Scalia, seems to have abandoned it.149
Whatever the flaws of Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Smith, however, the Court’s ruling
that the Free Exercise Clause may not be used to challenge a neutral law of general applicability
prevailed as a constitutional ruling that defines the extent of religious liberty.150 The ruling in
Smith significantly reduced the scope of constitutional protection accorded to religious conduct.
In Smith, the Court abandoned the use of strict scrutiny to review the regulation of religious
practices under neutral laws of general applicability. This granted the government considerably
more leeway to regulate religious activities than previously existed. Under the Smith calculus, as
long as a law is neutral toward religion, it application to religious conduct will be accepted as
constitutional with little or no justification for the law. Although Smith leaves standing the use
of strict scrutiny to review laws that target religious practices, laws that are neutral toward
religion are allowed to fly under the constitutional radar, escaping any sort of meaningful judicial
review, even when applied to regulate religious activity.
Justice O’Connor believed this was a serious mistake that truncated the First
Amendment. She asserted that the First Amendment does not distinguish between laws that are
generally applicable and those that target particular religious practices.151 From her perspective,
a general law that prohibits certain conduct—conduct that happens to be an act of worship for
140
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someone--manifestly prohibits that person’s free exercise of religion and therefore should be
subject to strict scrutiny.152 The majority’s repudiation of strict scrutiny “has no basis in
precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment value to the barest level of minimum scrutiny
that the Equal Protection Clause already provides.”153 In Justice O’Connor’s view, the Court’s
ruling was a dramatic departure from settled First Amendment jurisprudence and was
incompatible with the nation’s fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty.154
In certain corners Smith’s revisionist jurisprudence was viewed with apprehension, not to
say alarm. There were those who described Smith as a “sweeping disaster for religious
liberty.”155 One commentator went so far as to suggest that if the Court intended to defer to any
formally neutral law restricting religion, it has created “a legal framework for persecution.”156
At the opposite extreme, Smith had its defenders, who maintained that, despite the sundry
flaws of the Scalia opinion, the Court had reached the right result.157 The defenders of Smith
asserted that to create exemptions from neutral laws for religious practices amounted to
government favoritism of religion that raised serious constitutional concerns under both the Free
Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause.158
In 1993, Congress attempted to reverse the ruling in Smith by enacting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the stated purpose of which was to “restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”159 RFRA
expressly provided that “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” except where the
government can demonstrate that the burden is necessary to further a compelling state interest
and is the least restrictive means of doing so.160 RFRA, however, was short-lived: In City of
Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court, defending its prerogative to have the final say on the
meaning of the nation’s highest law, ruled that the Act was beyond Congressional authority and
therefore unconstitutional.161
The ruling in Smith was not particularly well-received among state courts, a number of
which, in interpreting free exercise guarantees in their own state constitutions, expressed
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disagreement with the decision and declined to adopt it at the state level.162 The Supreme Court
of Minnesota flatly declared that it would not follow the “limited analysis” in Smith and instead
would continue to apply strict scrutiny to laws challenged under the Minnesota free exercise
clause.163 Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals rejected what it described as “the inflexible
rule of Smith.”164 In addition, several state legislatures enacted state RFRAs mandating that the
state may burden the free exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that the application of the
burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compelling governmental interest.165
In the federal realm, however, despite the criticism leveled against it, the ruling in Smith
remained firm. And in time, the criticism of Smith diminished, if for no other reason than the
decision was a fait accompli that would not be reversed.166 At that point, the focus in free
exercise litigation became determining the boundaries of neutrality and general applicability.167
Three years after Smith, the Court turned its attention to delineating those boundaries in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah.168 There, in an opinion written by Justice
Kennedy, the Court struck down several ordinances prohibiting ritual sacrifice of animals.169 In
examining the ordinances, the Court treated neutrality and general applicability as separate
matters and found that the ordinances were neither neutral nor of general applicability.170
Regarding neutrality, the Court pointed to several aspects of the ordinances indicating that they
targeted religious conduct. First, the Court noted that the words “sacrifice” and “ritual,” used in
the text of the ordinances, have a religious origin but also admit of secular meaning.171 Although
the use of those words supported a claim of facial discrimination, it did not conclusively
demonstrate that claim.172 The Free Exercise Clause, however, extends beyond facial
discrimination to forbid “subtle departures from neutrality” and “covert suppression of particular
religious beliefs.”173 Government action that targets religious conduct for differential treatment
“cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.”174
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In further assessing the ordinances, the Court described them as a “religious
gerrymander” drafted in tandem to target a particular religion, the Santeria religion, which
engages in animal sacrifice as a central element of worship.175 Indeed, virtually the only conduct
subject to the ordinances was the religious exercise of Santeria church members.176 The
ordinances excluded almost all killing of animals except for religious sacrifice and further
exempted the killing of animals, such as kosher slaughtering, by other religions.177 The net result
of the gerrymander was that few if any killings of animals were prohibited other than Santeria
sacrifice, leading the Court to conclude that the Santeria religion was the exclusive target of the
ordinances.178
The ordinances were discriminatory in other aspects, as well. While purporting to ban
only the “unnecessary” killing of animals, the ordinances allowed hunting, slaughtering of
animals for food, eradication of pests, and euthanasia on the ground they were “necessary.”179
Even the use of live rabbits to train greyhounds for racing was permitted.180 Thus, the
ordinances deemed religious reasons for killing animals less important than nonreligious reasons,
and thereby singled out religious practice for discriminatory treatment.181
As revealed by the legislative record in the case, the discriminatory effect of the
ordinances was no accident.182 Members of the city council and other city officials, as well as
residents of the city, exhibited profound hostility toward the Santeria religion and its practice of
animal sacrifice.183 At meetings of the city council, the Santeria religion was described as
“abhorrent,” “an abomination to the Lord,” and “in violation of everything this country stands
for.”184 The president of the city council asked, “What can we do to prevent the Church from
opening?”185 When a member of the city council stated that in prerevolutionary Cuba people
were put in jail for practicing the Santeria religion, the audience applauded.186 Given this record,
there was no doubt that the ordinances were motivated by deep animosity toward the Santeria
religion.
Clearly, then, the ordinances were anything but neutral. Motivated by religious hostility,
targeted at a particular religious ritual, and gerrymandered to proscribe religious but not secular
killing of animals, the ordinances were aimed at suppressing the Santeria religion.187
Turning to the requirement of general applicability, the Court found that the ordinances
also fell short of that standard. This was apparent through an examination of the two interests
advanced by the city in support of the ordinances, protecting the public health and preventing
cruelty to animals.188 The ordinances were underinclusive as a means of achieving those ends,
because they failed to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangered those interests in a similar
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or greater degree than Santeria animal sacrifice did.189 Despite the city’s claimed interest in
preventing cruelty to animals, the ordinances forbade few killings other than those for religious
sacrifice. In fact, many types of animal killing for nonreligious reasons were either not
prohibited or expressly allowed under the ordinances.190
The Court also found that the ordinances were underinclusive in regard to the city’s
interest in public health, which was threatened by the unsanitary disposal of animal carcasses and
the consumption of uninspected meat.191 Neither of those harms was addressed by regulation
except in connection with religiously-motivated conduct, despite the fact that the health risks
posed by improper disposal of animal carcasses are the same whether preceded by religious
sacrifice or non-religious killing of animals.192 Neither hunters nor restaurants were subject to
the ordinances. Although unsanitary disposal is a general problem that causes substantial health
concerns, the ordinance only addressed it when resulting from religious conduct.193
The ordinances further were underinclusive as a means of deterring consumption of
uninspected meat. The goal of preventing consumption of uninspected meat was not addressed
in situations similar to religious animal sacrifice. Hunters were not prohibited from eating their
kill, nor fishermen from eating their catch. No law required the inspection of meat from animals
raised for the use of their owner, household members, or guests and employees.194 One of the
ordinances even granted an exemption to any person, group, or organization that slaughters or
processes “small numbers” of hogs or cattle “for sale.”195
The ordinances, then, were substantially underinclusive, and as such failed the
requirement of general applicability. Motivated by animosity and selectively targeting a
disfavored religion, the ordinances were afflicted by the precise evil that the requirement of
general applicability was designed to prevent.196
After concluding that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable, the
Court went on to apply strict scrutiny to them. As the Court said, a law burdening religious
practice that is neither neutral nor generally applicable must undergo “the most rigorous of
scrutiny.”197 This means that the law under question must advance interests of “the highest
order” and must be “narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.”198 As might be expected, the
city ordinances challenged in Lukumi could not pass that test. Clearly, the ordinances were not
drawn in narrow terms to effectuate their purported objectives of protecting the public health and
preventing cruelty to animals.199 To the contrary, all of the ordinances were either severely
overbroad or underinclusive.200 Their claimed objectives were not pursued in regard to similar
non-religious conduct, rendering the ordinances underinclusive to a substantial degree.201 Given
those circumstances, the ordinances could not be regarded as protecting a compelling state
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interest, and the Court therefore invalidated the ordinances on the ground that they violated the
Free Exercise Clause.202
There are several important lessons to be taken from Lukumi. One is that a close affinity
exists between the requirement of general applicability and the requirement of equal protection.
In discussing the principle of general applicability, the Court explicitly stated in Lukumi that
“The Free Exercise Clause protects religious observers against unequal treatment."203 Moreover,
Justice Kennedy’s opinion pointedly noted that in free exercise cases to determine if the object of
a law is neutral, guidance can be found in equal protection cases.204 In fact, “[n]eutrality in its
application requires an equal protection mode of analysis.”205
Throughout the Court’s opinion in Lukumi several equal protection concepts played a
prominent role. The Court stressed that the ordinances were improperly selective and
underinclusive. Religious conduct was singled out for discriminatory treatment that was
motivated by ill will and animosity. In sum, there was a denial of equal protection of the law and
therefore the law was neither generally applicable nor neutral.
Another significant lesson to be taken from Lukumi is that neutrality is not to be
determined simply from the text of a law. “Facial neutrality is not determinative…. Apart from
the text, the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.”206 In finding
that the ordinances were not neutral, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lukumi underscored the
discriminatory impact of the ordinances, which belied their benign appearance. Justice
Kennedy’s analysis, directed to assessing the effect of the ordinances in the real world,
reaffirmed that impermissible discrimination may occur through disparate impact, as well as
through statutory directives overtly designed to discriminate.
Moreover, legislative motive also is relevant to the determination of neutrality. Justice
Kennedy’s opinion207 explained that relevant evidence of non-neutrality includes, among other
things, the historical background of the law in question, the specific series of events leading to
enactment of the law, and contemporaneous statements made by members of the body that
enacted the law208—all of which are matters that go to legislative motive. And, of course, the
Kennedy opinion relied upon the presence of hostile legislative motive in concluding that the
ordinances were not neutral.
Although Justice Scalia joined the lion’s share of the Kennedy opinion, he entered a
separate concurring opinion taking issue with Justice Kennedy’s position in regard to the use of
motive to show non-neutrality.209 Justice Scalia objected to the use of legislative motive because
he believes that it is “virtually impossible to determine the singular ‘motive’ of a collective
legislative body.”210 In spite of Justice Scalia’s claim that the Court has a long tradition of
refraining from inquiries concerning legislative motive,211 it is a tradition that the Court has
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honored more in its breach than its observance.212 In fact, there are a number of areas in which
the Court regularly assesses legislative motive in reviewing the constitutionality of laws.213 As
for legislative motive being difficult or impossible to determine, that is not invariably so. To the
contrary, by the Court’s own admission, there are times when the dominant motive of the
legislature can be determined with a good deal of certainty from the legislative record.214 In
Lukumi, the dominant legislative motive—suppression of the Santeria religion—comes across
loud and clear. Even if legislative motive may be difficult to determine in some cases, there is
no reason to preclude its examination in cases such as Lukumi where that difficulty simply does
not exist.
Justice Souter entered a concurring opinion in Lukumi, offering a further refinement on
the matter of neutrality. Justice Souter believes that it is important to distinguish between a
requirement of formal neutrality, which bars deliberate discrimination, and a requirement of
substantial neutrality, which requires the government to justify any serious burden on religiously
motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.215 As Justice Souter reads it, the Scalia opinion in Smith plainly assumed that the Free
Exercise Clause required nothing more than formal equality.216 As a result, in Smith the Court
adopted what Justice Souter described as a “narrow conception of free-exercise neutrality” that
should be re-examined in an appropriate case.217 Lukumi, however, was not that case, because
the ordinances in question there were not neutral under any definition of neutrality.218 And since
Lukumi the Court has not shown any inclination to reexamine its ruling in Smith.
The Court barely mentioned Smith in Locke v. Davey, which involved a State of
Washington scholarship program that excluded students pursuing a degree in devotional
theology.219 A student who wished to use a scholarship to train for the ministry challenged the
exclusion on the ground that it violated the Free Exercise Clause. In an opinion written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the Court ruled that the exclusion of devotional studies from the scholarship
program did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Noting that the case involved the tension that
frequently exists between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the Court made it clear
at the outset that the Federal Constitution did not preclude Washington from allowing the
scholarships to be used to study for the ministry, if it chose to do so.220 The Supreme Court of
Washington, however, had interpreted its own constitution as barring even indirect funding of
religious instruction in preparation for the ministry.221 The student who challenged the program
contended that under Lukumi the program was presumptively unconstitutional because it was not
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facially neutral in regard to religion.222 The Court rejected that argument, stating that to do
otherwise would extend Lukumi well beyond both its facts and reasoning.223 In an attempt to
distinguish Lukumi, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that in Locke “the State’s disfavor of
religion (if it can be called that) is of a far milder kind” that imposed neither criminal nor civil
sanction on a religious activity.224 This purported distinction is not especially convincing. That
the State’s disfavor of religion in Locke is milder than it was in Lukumi hardly makes it neutral;
whether subject to a harsh or mild sanction, discrimination is nonetheless discrimination.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also maintained that in Locke the State “does not require students
to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit…. The State has
merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction.”225 This, too, is a flawed argument,
one of those false dichotomies to which Chief Justice Rehnquist often fell prey.226 That the State
has chosen to fund a distinct category of instruction does not preclude the possibility that the
State also has required students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a
government benefit. To the contrary, in choosing to fund a certain category of instruction the
State has in fact required students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a grant.
Chief Justice Rehnquist further professed that the Washington scholarship program did
not evince the hostility toward religion that was manifest in Lukumi.227 In his view, the program
went “a long way toward including religion in its benefits,” by permitting students to attend
pervasively religious schools and to take devotional theology courses so long as they were not
studying for the ministry.228 While it is correct that the Washington program in Locke did not
embody the sort of hostility to religion that abounded in Lukumi, whether this was sufficient to
distinguish the two cases is debatable.229
The true basis for distinguishing the cases, however, lies not in their comparative
neutrality, but rather in the justification offered for the laws in question in each case. As the
Court amply demonstrated in Lukumi, the ordinances there were not rationally related to any
compelling state interest. On the other hand, in Locke the exclusion of scholarships to train for
the ministry was adopted in order to avoid the use of taxpayer funds to subsidize religious
institutions, as required by the Establishment Clause of the Washington Constitution.230 As
Justice Rehnquist noted, many state constitutions prohibit the use of tax moneys to fund religious
activities.231 On the federal level, adherence to these state proscriptions makes for an appropriate
accommodation of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
Whatever the flaws of the Rehnquist opinion in Locke, the Court seemed to reach the
right result. As Erwin Chemerinsky has said, a converse ruling would have dramatically
changed the law and meant that any time a state provides assistance to secular entities it would
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be required to give the same aid to religious institutions.232 Surely a better result, and one that
accommodates both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause concerns, is to allow states
discretion to fund religious activities along with secular ones if they so choose, but not compel
them to do so if they choose otherwise. This, after all, is consistent with the principle that “there
are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free
Exercise Clause.”233
Justice Scalia dissented in Locke, taking a strange position in regard to neutrality. While
insisting that the Washington program violated the Free Exercise Clause because it facially
discriminated against religion, he allowed that this constitutional infirmity could be remedied by
eliminating the facial aspect of the discrimination.234 Justice Scalia asserted that this could be
done in any number of ways, such as making the scholarships redeemable only at public
universities or only for select courses of study.235 “Either option would replace a program that
facially discriminates against religion with one that just happens not to subsidize it.”236 In other
words, although Justice Scalia is adamantly opposed to facial discrimination, he finds no fault
with discriminatory impact. This, of course, is the other side of the coin to his position in Smith;
so long as a rule is generally applicable on its face, its disparate impact is of no concern.237 This
position seems to invite subterfuge; by cleansing the face of discrimination, its insidious effect in
the real world is allowed to persist.
Conclusion
Laws of general applicability are neutral on their faces in regard to religion and speech,
but may have a restrictive effect that impinges upon First Amendment religious or expressive
activities. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has taken the position in some cases that, even when
they restrict religion or speech, rules of general applicability do not implicate First Amendment
concerns. In Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., the Court ruled that the Free Speech Clause was not
violated by a rule of general applicability even where it had a restrictive effect upon expressive
activity.238 And in Employment Division v. Smith, the Court ruled that the Free Exercise Clause
was not violated by a neutral law of general applicability, even where it had a restrictive effect
upon religious activity.239 These rulings had the effect of nullifying the constitutional status of
religious and expressive activities when regulated under a general law and thereby removing
them from the scope of protection afforded by the First Amendment. Arcara, however, seems to
be an isolated decision that the Court has ignored in subsequent decisions involving freedom of
speech.240 In contrast, Smith established a relatively firm precedent for free exercise of religion
cases that effectuated a major doctrinal revision to the Free Exercise Clause.241
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, the Court formulated an important
boundary to the ruling in Smith, namely that the neutrality of a law is not to be determined
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simply from its text.242 Aside from its text, the effect of a law in its actual operation may be
cogent evidence that the law is aimed at religious activities.243 The discriminatory impact of a
law may disprove its benign appearance. Moreover, legislative motive may also be relevant to
the determination of neutrality.244 The legislative motivation underlying a law, as well as its
impact in the real world, must be assiduously examined to determine if the law is, in fact,
neutral. A law that is neutral on its face, but is shown by its impact or underlying motivation to
be aimed at religion will not be exempt from oversight under the First Amendment.
Still, there are laws that are genuinely neutral, designed to further valid secular ends.
Under the approach taken in Smith, truly neutral rules of general applicability, even when used to
regulate religious or expressive activities are removed from First Amendment oversight and, as a
result, are subject to no more than minimal judicial scrutiny under either the Due Process Clause
or Equal Protection Clause. This relegates First Amendment values to the barest level of
constitutional protection.245 Minimal scrutiny is the least demanding of the three tiers of
scrutiny—strict, intermediate, and minimal—formulated by the Supreme Court. In fact, minimal
scrutiny (also referred to as “rationality review”) usually operates as virtually no scrutiny at all.
When utilizing minimal scrutiny, the Supreme Court purports to require that legislation be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest, but in most instances the Court blindly accepts the
legislative judgment under review with no genuine examination.246 In the vast majority of cases,
minimal scrutiny functions as a rubber stamp for legislation, providing little more than a pretense
of rationality.247
In Smith, in withdrawing First Amendment protection from the plaintiff’s claim, the
Court explicitly refused to follow the ruling in previous cases that strict scrutiny should be used
to review free exercise claims.248 Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion in Smith, was
averse to the use of strict scrutiny, fearful that many rules of general applicability that affect
religious practices would be unable to meet the high standard that it sets.249
In response, it should be pointed out that strict scrutiny, though rigorous, is not an
impossible hurdle to overcome. In fact, laws specifically directed at religious or expressive
activities that are subject to strict scrutiny do not invariably fail to pass constitutional muster. A
number of laws regulating religion or speech reviewed under strict scrutiny have been found to
be constitutionally justified by being narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.
For example, in a free speech case, Burson v. Freeman, the Court used strict scrutiny in
upholding a state law that prohibited the solicitation of votes or the display or campaign
materials within 100 feet of the entrance of a polling place.250 The Court concluded that the law
was constitutionally justified because it served the compelling state interest of preventing voter
242
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intimidation and election fraud. In a more recent case (discussed previously),251 Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, the Court employed strict scrutiny in sustaining a federal statute
making it a crime to give advice to foreign terrorist organizations. The Court found that the
statute, even as applied to expressive conduct concerning lawful, nonviolent activities, was
constitutionally justified by the compelling state interest in protecting national security from the
threats posed by foreign terrorist organizations.
In religion cases, also, strict scrutiny is not invariably insurmountable. For instance, in
United States v. Lee, a case decided prior to Smith when generally applicable rules that burdened
religious practices were still subject to strict scrutiny, the Court upheld a federal law requiring
the payment of Social Security taxes that was challenged by an Amish individual on the ground
that the law violated his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. 252 Although the
Court acknowledged that the payment or receipt of taxes was forbidden by the Amish faith, the
Court nonetheless found that the tax law was justified, even as applied to the Amish, because the
law was essential to accomplish the overriding governmental interest of providing a
comprehensive insurance system for all Americans.253 In Smith itself, Justice O’Connor entered
a concurring opinion maintaining that the prohibition of peyote, even when used for sacramental
purposes, was constitutionally justified because it was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
state interest in enforcing laws that control the possession and use of harmful drugs.254 In Justice
O’Connor’s view, although there was no question that the prohibition of peyote placed a serve
burden on the plaintiffs’ ability to freely exercise their religion, the state had an overriding
interest in preventing drug abuse, “one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare
of our population.”255 Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Smith as well as the opinions of the Court
in Burson and Lee illustrate that strict scrutiny is not as insurmountable as Justice Scalia believes
it to be.
Moreover, a more lenient, though still meaningful standard of review, intermediate
scrutiny, is also available in cases involving religious or expressive activities. Whereas strict
scrutiny requires the showing of a compelling state interest to sustain a law, intermediate
scrutiny prescribes a less demanding standard that calls for the showing of an important or
substantial state interest to sustain a law.256 And while strict scrutiny requires that legislative
means be absolutely necessary to accomplish their ends, intermediate scrutiny expects that
legislative means be carefully tailored, though not absolutely necessary, to accomplish their
ends.257 In practice, intermediate scrutiny has proven to be less severe than strict scrutiny and in
numerous cases when using intermediate scrutiny the Court has upheld laws challenged on First
Amendment grounds.258
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Intermediate scrutiny would seem to be an appropriate standard of review to assess rules
of general applicability that have a restrictive effect upon religious activities. While rules of
general applicability have valid secular ends and therefore are less constitutionally suspect than
laws specifically aimed at religion, if their effect is to restrict religious activities, they should not
be entirely exempt from meaningful review. Intermediate scrutiny offers a happy medium for
reviewing laws where neither strict nor minimal scrutiny is warranted.
In fact, intermediate scrutiny was originally devised in a First Amendment case involving
a neutral law of general applicability. The case was United States v. O’Brien, in which an
individual was convicted of burning his draft card in violation of a federal statute prohibiting the
mutilation or destruction of a draft card. 259 As described by the Court, the statute was directed
on its face to conduct having no connection with speech and therefore plainly did not abridge
free speech on its face.260 In fact, the Court stated that “A law prohibiting destruction of
Selective Service certificates no more abridges free speech on its face than a motor vehicle law
prohibiting the destruction of drivers' licenses, or a tax law prohibiting the destruction of books
and records.”261 In other words, the statute was a law of general applicability neutral in regard to
speech. Be that as it may, Mr. O’Brien, who had burned his draft card as an act of symbolic
expression to protest the war in Viet Nam, argued that the statute was unconstitutional as applied
to him because it penalized his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.262
The case, then, presented a dilemma of what level of scrutiny the Court should use to
resolve the issue at hand. At the time of the case, only two levels of scrutiny, minimal and strict,
had been formulated. The conduct in question in the case—burning a draft card—had elements
of both speech and action. On one hand it expressed an idea—in fact, a political idea—that, if
presented in a more pure form of speech such as the printed page or the spoken word, would be
entitled to the protection of strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. On the other hand,
O’Brien had engaged in action—burning a draft card—that ordinarily would evoke only minimal
constitutional protection. Why not compromise, then, and follow a middle course, a level of
scrutiny intermediate to strict and minimal? And that is exactly what the Court did in O’Brien
by articulating what was then a new constitutional standard of review that required the
government to show an “important or substantial” governmental interest in justification of the
law in question, that is, a higher standard than the mere rationality of minimal scrutiny but lower
than the compelling state interest of strict scrutiny.263 Thus, in O’Brien the Court charted an
intermediate course of constitutional review.
In O’Brien, the Court created an intermediate level of scrutiny as a compromise to
resolve the dilemma of what level of scrutiny to use in cases involving conduct that combines
elements of speech and action. But O’Brien also can be seen as a case adopting an intermediate
level of scrutiny to deal with constitutional challenges to laws of general applicability that have a
restrictive effect on freedom of speech. The Court emphasized in O’Brien that the statute in
question was not on its face directed to expressive activities; i.e., it was a neutral law of general
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applicability. But the Court did not think minimal scrutiny was the appropriate standard to
utilize in the case, precisely because, as applied, the statute had a restrictive impact upon
freedom of expression.
The intermediate course chartered in O’Brien seems to provide a particularly suitable
means for assessing rules of general applicability that restrict religious activities. Because they
are not specifically aimed at religious or expressive activities, rules of general applicability may
not be considered presumptively unconstitutional, as is the practice under strict scrutiny. Still,
when employed to regulate religious activities, rules of general applicability should not enjoy the
extreme tolerance allowed under minimal scrutiny, which in practice operates as virtually no
scrutiny at all. Intermediate scrutiny, then, seems to be an appropriate compromise by which to
evaluate rules of general applicability that are brought to bear on religious activities.
The notion that rules of general applicability should escape meaningful judicial review
even when they infringe religious or expressive activities is a dubious proposition that runs
counter to the understanding that a law that is constitutional on its face may be unconstitutional
as applied in a particular situation. Smith and Arcara are problematic decisions that retract the
scope of First Amendment protection afforded to religious and expressive activities and give
constitutional immunity to general laws that restrict the free exercise of religion and freedom of
speech. To say, as some justices have, that the First Amendment is not implicated by a general
law that “just happens” to restrict speech or religion264 or that imposes an “incidental” burden on
speech or religion265 is a dismissive attitude that disregards the reality that general laws may
place severe burdens on First Amendment activities. In most circumstances, the Supreme Court
has recognized that, although a law appears innocent on its face, it may have harmful effects in
the real world that raise serious constitutional concerns. Rules of general applicability, clothed
in neutrality, may appear to be innocent, but appearances, after all, can be deceiving.
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